Defense Modernization and Financial Accountability Bill
At a Glance
- Requires commercial solutions before custom development for defense acquisitions
- DoD must pass a clean audit within 24 months or generals take a 10% pay cut
- Mandates force structure reassessment incorporating lessons from Ukraine
- $5B annually to diversify defense supply chains and reduce foreign dependence
- Secures intellectual property rights to end sole-source vendor lock-in

The United States maintains the world's most capable military, yet the systems that equip our forces are increasingly delivered late, over budget, and sometimes obsolete before they reach the warfighter. The defense acquisition process—designed for a different era—has become a barrier to military readiness rather than an enabler of it. Major weapons programs routinely exceed initial cost estimates by billions of dollars and slip schedules by years or decades. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, conceived in the 1990s, still struggles with software deficiencies and sustainment costs decades later. When the government does not own the technical data and intellectual property rights for the systems it buys, it becomes locked into sole-source sustainment contracts that drive costs even higher. Meanwhile, adversaries field new capabilities at a fraction of the cost and time, exploiting commercial technologies that American defense procurement struggles to incorporate. Small businesses and non-traditional companies that could inject competition and innovation face certification timelines, compliance burdens, and slow payment cycles that effectively bar them from the market.
The war in Ukraine has exposed uncomfortable truths about modern conflict. Precision-guided munitions, drones, and electronic warfare have transformed the battlefield in ways that challenge long-held assumptions about force structure and platform survivability. Inexpensive drones destroy tanks costing millions. Commercial satellite imagery provides real-time intelligence. Encrypted communications on civilian devices coordinate military operations. The conflict has demonstrated that mass, adaptability, and the ability to rapidly produce and replace losses matter as much as technological superiority in any single platform. America's defense industrial base, consolidated over decades into a handful of prime contractors producing exquisite but limited quantities of expensive systems, is not postured to sustain a prolonged high-intensity conflict. The skilled workforce needed to expand that base—machinists, welders, engineers, shipyard workers—has been hollowed out by decades of offshoring and underinvestment, and cannot be reconstituted overnight.
Supply chain vulnerabilities compound these challenges. Critical components—semiconductors, rare earth minerals, precision bearings, specialized chemicals—often depend on single sources, sometimes located in or controlled by potential adversaries. The COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent supply disruptions revealed how fragile these dependencies have become. In a sustained conflict against a peer adversary, the United States could find itself unable to replace losses or surge production when it matters most. Strengthening ties with allied nations to create redundant manufacturing capacity and diversified supply chains is not merely prudent planning—it is a strategic imperative.
Underlying all of these challenges is a fundamental lack of financial accountability. The Department of Defense has failed every annual audit since the first was conducted in fiscal year 2018[1], remaining the only major federal agency never to achieve a clean opinion. Auditors have identified 28 material weaknesses in financial reporting[1]. The Pentagon's books have required trillions of dollars in adjustments[2]. The department cannot fully account for $4.7 trillion in assets spread across 4,500 locations worldwide[3]. This is not merely an accounting problem—it reflects systemic failures in tracking equipment, managing inventory, and stewarding taxpayer resources. Without accurate financial data, informed decisions about resource allocation, readiness, and investment are impossible.
This legislation addresses these interconnected failures through comprehensive reform. The defense acquisition process will be restructured to favor commercially available solutions that meet requirements over bespoke systems from a limited number of prime contractors, reducing costs and accelerating delivery. The government will secure intellectual property and data rights for the systems it funds, breaking vendor lock-in and enabling competitive sustainment. Barriers that prevent small businesses and non-traditional innovators from competing for defense contracts will be reduced. The Department of Defense will conduct a fundamental reassessment of force structure and spending priorities within 12 months, incorporating lessons from Ukraine and the realities of modern asymmetric warfare. Supply chain resilience will be strengthened through diversification of domestic manufacturing and deepened cooperation with allied nations. And financial accountability will be enforced through meaningful consequences: the department must develop an audit remediation plan within 12 months and implement it within 24 months. Failure to meet audit requirements thereafter will result in a 10% pay reduction for active-duty generals and admirals and dismissal of the Secretary of Defense—ensuring that leadership has personal stake in restoring public trust in defense spending.
Problems the Bill Aims to Solve
Broken Defense Acquisition Model. Major weapons programs consistently exceed budgets by billions of dollars and deliver years or decades behind schedule. The process designed to ensure accountability has instead created bureaucratic delays, risk aversion, and cost overruns that leave warfighters waiting for systems that may be outdated upon arrival. Programs routinely advance past milestones despite failing operational tests, resulting in systems fielded before they are operationally suitable.
Overreliance on Bespoke Solutions from Limited Suppliers. The defense industrial base has consolidated into a small number of prime contractors who deliver custom-built systems at premium prices. Commercially available technologies that could meet requirements at lower cost and faster timelines are often excluded by procurement processes designed around traditional defense contractors.
Barriers to Small Business and Non-Traditional Competitors. Startups, small manufacturers, and technology companies outside the traditional defense sector face lengthy certification timelines, burdensome compliance requirements, and payment cycles that can stretch months—effectively barring the most innovative firms from competing for defense work. The result is less competition, higher prices, and slower adoption of commercial breakthroughs.
Vendor Lock-In Through Intellectual Property and Data Rights. The Department of Defense frequently fails to secure technical data rights and intellectual property for the systems it funds. Without ownership of design data, the government cannot competitively bid sustainment, maintenance, or upgrades, locking it into sole-source contracts with the original developer at whatever price that contractor sets—often for the entire multi-decade life of a platform.
Failure to Adapt to Modern Warfare Realities. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that asymmetric capabilities—drones, precision munitions, electronic warfare, commercial technologies—can neutralize expensive conventional platforms. Current force structure and spending priorities reflect assumptions about warfare that may no longer hold, yet institutional inertia resists fundamental reassessment.
Inability to Produce at Scale for Sustained Conflict. America's defense industrial base can produce exquisite systems in limited quantities but lacks the capacity to surge production or replace losses in a prolonged high-intensity conflict. Production lines are optimized for peacetime efficiency rather than wartime surge capacity.
Erosion of the Defense Skilled Workforce. The machinists, welders, shipyard workers, and engineers needed to build and maintain military systems have been hollowed out by decades of offshoring, facility closures, and underinvestment in vocational training. Without a pipeline of skilled labor, even fully funded production expansions cannot translate into actual output.
Fragile and Concentrated Supply Chains. Critical defense components depend on single sources, sole suppliers, or foreign manufacturers—sometimes in nations that could become adversaries. Disruption of any link could halt production of essential systems when they are needed most.
Insufficient Coordination with Allied Manufacturing. Allied nations possess complementary industrial capabilities that could provide redundancy and surge capacity, yet formal mechanisms to integrate allied supply chains and coordinate wartime production remain underdeveloped.
Chronic Financial Accountability Failures. The Department of Defense has failed every audit since fiscal year 2018[1] and remains the only major federal agency never to achieve a clean opinion. Auditors have identified 28 material weaknesses[1], and the department cannot fully account for trillions in assets and liabilities. The Pentagon cannot accurately track weapons, vehicles, ammunition, and other assets distributed across thousands of locations worldwide, undermining readiness assessments, maintenance planning, and informed investment decisions. Hundreds of legacy financial and logistics systems that cannot communicate effectively produce inconsistent data that auditors cannot verify, and modernization of these systems has been slow and underfunded. The continued inability to account for hundreds of billions in annual appropriations erodes public confidence that taxpayer dollars are being spent effectively and jeopardizes sustained support for necessary defense investments.
Misaligned Incentives and Lack of Accountability in Leadership. Despite years of audit failures, no senior leader has faced meaningful consequences. Current structures allow senior military and civilian leaders to rotate through positions without bearing responsibility for long-term financial management failures or acquisition program performance, diffusing accountability across administrations and leadership tenures. The revolving door between senior Pentagon positions and defense contractor executive suites creates conflicts of interest that undermine objective acquisition decisions and oversight. Without personal accountability, there is insufficient incentive for the cultural and systemic changes required to achieve financial transparency.
Defense Modernization and Financial Accountability Act
120th Congress, 2nd Session
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
Sec. 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Defense Modernization and Financial Accountability Act."
Sec. 2. DEFINITIONS.
- (1) COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE SOLUTION.—The term "commercially available solution" means a product, service, or technology sold in substantial quantities in the commercial marketplace that meets or can be modified to meet Department requirements without significant custom development.
- (2) ALLIED NATION.—The term "allied nation" means a NATO member, a major non-NATO ally, or a nation with which the United States has a mutual defense treaty.
- (3) CLEAN AUDIT OPINION.—The term "clean audit opinion" means an unmodified opinion on the Department's financial statements issued by an independent auditor.
- (4) SENIOR MILITARY OFFICER.—The term "senior military officer" means any commissioned officer in pay grade O-7 or above.
Sec. 3. ACQUISITION REFORM—PREFERENCE FOR COMMERCIAL SOLUTIONS.
- (1) In any acquisition exceeding $10,000,000, the Department shall survey the commercial marketplace before initiating custom development.
- (2) Where a commercial solution meets not less than 80 percent of requirements, it shall be selected unless the Secretary of Defense certifies that no commercial solution can be adapted, modification cost exceeds custom development cost, or national security precludes commercial use.
- (3) The Department shall report annually to Congress on commercial alternatives evaluated for each major defense acquisition program.
Sec. 4. FORCE STRUCTURE AND SPENDING REASSESSMENT.
- (1) Not later than 12 months after enactment, the Secretary of Defense shall complete a comprehensive reassessment incorporating lessons from Ukraine regarding unmanned systems, precision munitions, electronic warfare, and commercial technologies; evaluating survivability and cost-effectiveness of major platforms; assessing industrial base surge capacity; and proposing reallocations toward capabilities demonstrated effective in modern warfare.
- (2) The reassessment shall be submitted to Congress as both a classified report and an unclassified summary.
Sec. 5. SUPPLY CHAIN DIVERSIFICATION.
- (1) The Secretary shall identify single points of failure, foreign adversary dependencies, and components lacking domestic or allied manufacturing capability.
- (2) DEFENSE MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT PROGRAM.—There is established a program to provide grants, loans, and loan guarantees to domestic manufacturers expanding production of critical defense components. There are authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000,000 annually for fiscal years 2026 through 2030.
Sec. 6. ALLIED MANUFACTURING COORDINATION AGREEMENTS.
- (1) The Secretary of Defense shall negotiate agreements with allied nations to establish reciprocal production arrangements, shared stockpile reserves, coordinated surge production plans, and harmonized technical standards.
- (2) A status report shall be submitted to Congress within 24 months of enactment.
Sec. 7. AUDIT REMEDIATION AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY.
- (1) PLAN.—Not later than 12 months after enactment, the Secretary shall submit a detailed remediation plan with corrective actions for each material weakness, quarterly benchmarks, cost estimates, and named senior officials responsible.
- (2) IMPLEMENTATION.—The Department shall achieve a clean audit opinion within 24 months of enactment.
- (3) CONSEQUENCES FOR FAILURE.—If a clean audit opinion is not achieved within 24 months—
- (a) the rate of basic pay for all senior military officers in grade O-7 and above shall be reduced by 10 percent until compliance is achieved; and
- (b) the President shall dismiss the Secretary of Defense within 60 days, unless the President certifies to Congress that the Secretary has demonstrated substantial progress and that dismissal would be detrimental to national security.
- (4) The Comptroller General shall independently assess audit progress semiannually.
Sec. 8. LEGACY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MODERNIZATION.
- (1) Not later than 12 months after enactment, the Secretary shall submit a plan for modernizing all legacy financial and logistics systems that impede audit compliance, with completion within 5 years.
- (2) There are authorized to be appropriated $3,000,000,000 annually for fiscal years 2026 through 2030.
Sec. 9. INSPECTOR GENERAL EXPANDED AUTHORITY.
- (1) The Inspector General of the Department of Defense shall have authority to conduct unannounced audits, access all financial records without restriction, and issue subpoenas for documents and testimony.
- (2) Inspector General reports on financial accountability shall not be subject to review by any other office prior to transmission to Congress.
Sec. 10. EFFECTIVE DATE.
This Act shall take effect on the date of enactment.
Sources
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-24-107478, "DOD Financial Management: FY 2023 Financial Statement Audit Progress and Challenges." https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107478
- Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, "Understanding the Results of the Audit of the DoD Financial Statements." https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/1725880/understanding-the-results-of-the-audit-of-the-dod-fy-2018-financial-statements/
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-25-108052, "DOD Financial Management: Insights into FY 2024 Balance Sheet Auditability." https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-108052